In his report Antiquities Trafficking in Syria Olivier Moos made the interesting and important observation that dealers on the ground inside Syria might buy looted coins and other precious metal antiquities according to their bullion value and not their projected sales value on the international market (Moos 2020: 11, 29). Until now, quoted on-the-ground prices for looted antiquities inside Syria have usually been considered suspect because they appear unrealistically high. But if prices for coins are indeed linked to their bullion value, then bullion value provides an objective measure of price inside Syria that can be used in conjunction with published prices on the retail end-market to investigate the pricing structure of the coin trade.
A good coin to start with is the Roman-Byzantine gold solidus. The solidus was introduced by the Roman emperor Constantine I (306-337 AD) and for centuries afterwards it was produced with high purity gold (98 per cent) and a consistent weight of 4.5 grams. Debasement started in the eighth century and became marked from the tenth century onwards (Grierson 1999; Morrison 2002). Hundreds of solidi (at least) are known to have been found in Syria through legitimate excavations and hundreds if not thousands more must have been found through looting. Solidi would lose weight through wear during circulation, but for some basic exploratory calculations it can be assumed that in bullion terms today a solidus minted before 700 AD is a lump of pure gold and would be priced according to weight by dealers inside Syria. From 2012–2013, gold was trading on the international market for about 50–55 USD per gram, dropping during 2014–2019 to about 40 USD per gram. Thus in 2012–2013, a newly-looted solidus weighing 4.5 grams could have been sold for 236 USD, dropping to 180 USD from 2014–2019.
Outside Syria, over the period 2011–2020 three US/UK numismatic companies between them sold 3,883 fourth-to-seventh-century solidi for an average (mean) price of 1,082 per cent of their bullion value (1). This average figure was inflated by the sale of some exceptional high-priced coins. The highest price achieved was 62,625 per cent of bullion value (140,000 USD) for a coin minted in Ravenna of a type not likely to be found in Syria. The highest price paid for a coin minted in Constantinople of a type that could be found in Syria was 43,563 per cent of bullion value (65,000 USD). The median price of the sold solidi was lower at 323 per cent of bullion value. In other words, a looted coin sold for 200 USD inside Syria in 2018 would most likely have been sold in the UK or USA for about 646 USD, but on average, because of the high price of rare coins, for every coin sold for 200 USD inside Syria the UK or US company would have made 2,164 USD. Thus the pricing structure of the coin trade is dependent upon end-market companies with the knowledge necessary to recognise high value coins and access to similarly knowledgeable customers with the means to pay for them. The price of gold might form a floor beneath which coin prices cannot drop, but rarity is a more important determinant of end-market price. Presumably dealers inside Syria or its immediately neighbouring countries are able to sell coins for more than bullion value or else it would be easier to sell them for melting and recycling. Judging by the numbers of coins in circulation, that doesn’t happen. Dealers inside Syria may well be able to recognise rare and potentially expensive coins themselves, but without access to wealthy end-market customers they will be unable to capitalise upon their expertise.
Moos illustrated 25 Byzantine solidi that had been advertised on Telegram on 21 November 2018 (Moos 2020: 25). Gold that day was trading for 39 USD per gram, so inside Syria each coin would have been sold for approximately 176 USD, a total of 4,400 USD. The coins are only illustrated in reverse, but they look to be seventh century in date, from the reigns of the Byzantine emperors Phocas (602–610 AD), Heraclius (610–641 AD) and Constans II (641–668 AD). Over the period 2018–2019, the three UK/US companies sold 193 solidi attributed to these three emperors, for an average (mean) price of 496 USD and a median price 358 USD. A coin very similar to one illustrated by Moos, possibly the same coin, was sold recently on Catawiki as a solidus of Heraclius with Heraclius Constantine and Heraclonas for 455 EUR, say 500 USD (shown above). The Telegram account was used by members in Idlib Governorate in territory controlled by the Salafist group Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS). HTS has imposed a 20 per cent tax on antiquities sales and is believed to monitor the Telegram account to ensure that tax is paid (Moos 2020: 7). Thus the seller of the solidi would have needed to pay 880 USD tax. It is possible that coins might be sold inside Syria for more than their bullion value, with their bullion value being declared to HTS for tax purposes (Moos 2020: 11). Nevertheless, prices on the ground would still need to reflect gold prices.
At the present time, gold is selling for more than 60 USD per gram, so a solidus that in November 2018 might have been sold inside Syria for 176 USD could today be sold for 270 USD. For the hoard of 25 solidi, that would be 2,350 USD more. This marked increase in prices inside Syria might be enough to persuade some previously undecided people that it is worth their while to go out searching for gold coins to sell. High gold prices have not previously been considered an incentive for looting, but it is possible that they are just that.
1) Percentage bullion value = ((Price of solidus at sale/weight in grams of solidus)/Price per gram of gold on same day as sale)*100.
TimeLine Auctions has been doing a brisk trade in Iraqi cuneiform tablets this year. In its February sale, it offered and sold 14 cuneiform-inscribed objects for a total of £38,088 at an average price of £2,721. In its June sale, it offered 20 objects, selling 18 for a total of £36,810 at an average price of £2,045. A further 10 objects are offered in its forthcoming September sale. The tablets generally are of singular interest and look to be derived from one or more private collections. Provenance descriptions are vague as usual, usually anonymous, though often providing a date range to indicate the approximate timing of an object’s arrival in a private collection outside Iraq. The dating breakdown for 43 objects is as follows:
Number of objects
Late 1980s–early 1990s
Provenances can be invented and fabricated, but taking these TimeLine provenance dates at face value, only two objects can be placed outside Iraq before 6 August 1990, the date of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661. UNSCR 661 placed a trade embargo upon Iraqi goods, including cultural objects, and the embargo on cultural objects is still in force. It was reaffirmed in May 2003 by UNSCR 1483. Article 7 of UNSCR 1483 specifically states that the trade in Iraqi cultural objects would be prohibited when ‘reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed’ from Iraq since the adoption of UNSCR 661. On 14 June 2003, UNSCR 1483 was implemented in the United Kingdom as the Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003. Article 8(2) of the Iraq (UN Sanctions) Order requires that:
Any person who holds or controls any item of illegally removed Iraqi cultural property must cause the transfer of that item to a constable.
Article 8(4) defines ‘illegally removed Iraqi cultural property’ as:
Iraqi cultural property and any other item of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific or religious importance illegally removed from any location in Iraq since 6th August 1990.
Thus the date threshold in the UK for discriminating between Iraqi cultural objects legally and illegally on the market remains 6 August 1990. Any objects moved out of Iraq after that date must be surrendered to an appropriate law enforcement agency.
The TimeLine tablets that cannot definitively be placed outside Iraq before 6 August 1990 (all but two) were quite obviously not surrendered to law enforcement, presumably because it was impossible to prove that they actually did move out of Iraq after that date (which isn’t to say that they didn’t). Thus unless TimeLine has documentation with more precise dating information that it has decided not to share, the provenance dates provided for most objects straddle the 6 August 1990 threshold and are useless for determining the legitimacy of a piece according to UK law. Perhaps the objects concerned did all leave Iraq before 6 August 1990 – there is no way of knowing.
Having said that, three objects do look particularly suspect. The first is lot 259 sold for £16,000 in June 2020 with a provenance dated to the late 1980s-early 1990s. It is a rare Jemdet Nasr pictographic tablet that according to its provenance was published in 2016 by Salvatore F. Monaco as no. 131 in Archaic Cuneiform Tablets From Private Collections. Monaco commented that the texts published therein had been taken from photographs of tablets sold on the Internet that:
all come from Illicit excavations, which, although carried out by looters since the middle of the nineteenth century, had recently attained, as a consequence of the political situation, an unprecedented level of growth (Monaco 2016: 1).
The second is lot 242 sold for £2,800 in June 2020 with a provenance dated to the late 1980s-early 1990s. It is a New Babylonian foundation brick from Larsa carrying an inscription of Nebuchadnezzar. Nearly a decade ago now, I drew attention to similar bricks appearing on the market, showing how they had been cut down from their original size, presumably to facilitate transport (Brodie 2011: 125-126). Since then, I have been sporadically monitoring the market and I have now logged more than 30 examples of similar cut-down bricks. Although some have unconfirmed provenance dates stretching back to the 1960s, none was documented publicly before 2003 and the suspicion persists that these bricks were all looted from Larsa in the early 2000s.
Finally, there is lot 175 in the forthcoming September 2020 sale, which is a large Ur III administrative tablet attributed to Adad-tillati of the site of Garšana. There is no date included in the provenance description. Garšana is notorious as a site looted sometime during the 1990s and the source of a large archive of Adad-tillati tablets, most of which are in the possession of Cornell University (Owen and Mayr 2007; Molina 2020: 325-327).
The sale of these three objects calls into question TimeLine’s due diligence. If I can discover suspicious uncertainties about their provenance, anyone can. Does TimeLine simply take the consignor’s word at face value, or does it conduct its own provenance research or validation? Apparently, it leaves responsibility (and any culpability) with the (anonymous) consignor. In its extremely small print terms and conditions, TimeLine has this to say:
TimeLine do not make or give any guarantee, warranty or representation or undertake any duty of care in relation to the description, illustrations or photographs of any Lot, including condition, quality, provenance, authenticity, background, style, period, age, origin, value and estimated selling price. TimeLine undertakes no obligation to examine, investigate or carry out any tests either in sufficient depth or at all to establish the accuracy or otherwise of any description or opinions given by TimeLine whether in the catalogue or elsewhere.
No guarantee or duty of care regarding provenance. Caveat emptor. The small print continues:
in submitting any Lot for sale, the Seller warrants and represents to TimeLine the matters set out in the Property Acceptance/Receipt and Seller’s statement of provenance.
That is the summary of TimeLine’s due diligence: requesting the consignor to sign off on provenance. TimeLine is protecting itself but not the buyer.
Contrast TimeLine’s policy of absent due diligence to the more proactive one advocated by the Antiquities Dealers Association (ADA) in its code of conduct:
Members undertake to carry out Due Diligence, as set out under this Code, to ensure, as far as they are able, that objects in which they trade were not stolen from excavations, architectural monuments, public institutions or private property and are lawfully on the market for sale.
Members will make all reasonable enquiries to ascertain earlier ownership history of any object they are considering purchasing, mindful that the illicit removal of archaeological objects from their original context is damaging to our knowledge and understanding of the past.
The ADA subscribes to the tenets of the Hague Convention and will pay particular attention to items that may have originated from conflict zones.
In these instances further documentation should be sought from the seller demonstrating they have been in circulation outside the conflict zone prior to conflict.
The ADA is also governed by the following: Objects originating from Syria are subject to restrictions as required by (EU) Council Regulation No. 1332/2013 of 13 December 2013 amending (EU) Council Regulation No. 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003 prohibits the importation or exportation of any cultural property illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990.
Thus for objects from Iraq, the ADA requires its members to seek ‘further documentation’ supporting an object’s legitimacy, not simply to secure a warranty. TimeLine is not a member of the ADA and so is not in contravention of the ADA’s code. TimeLine is a member of the Association of International Dealers (AIAD), which states in its own more limited code of conduct:
4. PROVENANCE. The Member agrees to maintain full and accurate records of relevant sales and purchases. Provenance of any item offered for sale is to be established to the extent that this is reasonably achievable, and the description thereof is to be as full and accurate as possible.
8. The Member agrees not knowingly to deal in any cultural objects that have left Iraq after 6/8/90, in compliance with The Iraq (U.N. Sanctions) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/1519).
According to its small print terms and conditions, TimeLine interprets ‘reasonably achievable’ as meaning nothing at all. And if it isn’t actively looking for evidence of illegal trading it will not find it and cannot knowingly deal in cultural objects that have left Iraq since 6 August 1990, even if they have. This looks a lot like wilful avoidance of disagreeable and commercially damaging evidence of wrongdoing. It casts doubt upon the integrity of TimeLine, and because it is in full accord with the AIAD code of conduct, upon the AIAD itself.
All lots with an upper estimate value of £1,000 and above, and all Western Asiatic lots are searched against the Art Loss Register database.
So, all these cuneiform tablets (Western Asiatic lots) will have been searched against the ALR database. This is necessary but not sufficient provenance research. ALR certificates state that they do not provide a clean bill of health for antiquities, merely that searched antiquities have not been reported stolen. For looted antiquities, clandestinely excavated, that can never be the case. For cuneiform tablets of the type being discussed here, a search is practically worthless. it obviously failed to uncover anything untoward about the three suspect objects I have highlighted. So the prominent placement of the ALR logo, while technically and legally correct, might give the impression to a naïve customer that the provenance of an object being offered for sale has been well researched, which is not in fact the case. The logo provides the appearance but not the substance of appropriate due diligence. It does more to protect TimeLine’s reputation than it does to ensure its commercial probity. It remains the case that the ALR needs to reconsider its association with a company openly failing to conduct its own provenance research and placing itself outside generally accepted standards of professional practice as advertised by the ADA.
If any or all of the cuneiform tablets offered by TimeLine were taken from Iraq after 6 August 1990, which seems possible if not likely, it demonstrates how after a period of time spent languishing in anonymous private collections they can be sold openly without fear of any police or legal action. The objects are in effect ‘gray’, as in Mackenzie and Yates’ second sense of the term. Three are very dark gray indeed – almost black.
Brodie, Neil, 2011. Academic involvement in the market in Iraqi antiquities, in Crime in the Art and Antiquities World: Illegal Trafficking in Cultural Property, edited by Stefano Manacorda and Duncan Chappell. New York: Springer, 117-133.
Molina, Manuel, 2020. The looting of Ur III tablets after the Gulf Wars, in Dealing with Antiquity: Past, Present & Future, edited by Walter Sommerfeld. Münster: Ugarit, 323-352.
Monaco Salvatore F., 2016. Archaic Cuneiform Tablets From Private Collections, (Cornell University Studies in Assyriology and Sumerology 31). Bethesda: CDL.
Owen, David I. and Rudolf H. Mayr, 2007. The Garšana Archives, (Cornell University Studies in Assyriology and Sumerology 3). Bethesda: CDL.
I am a sucker for a good graphic, and the recent Rand report into illicit antiquities has a bunch of good ones, in particular a quadrant plot used for exploring the structure of the antiquities market (Rand 2020: figures S.1, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13). This graphic offers a means of looking at market structures generally, using axes of visibility (covert to overt) and legality (legal to illegal) to construct a conceptual transaction space. Two of the quadrants (covert-legal and open-illegal) are considered to demarcate gray market space, with the antiquities market placed firmly towards the overt end of the visibility axis and straddling the divide between legal and illegal on the legality axis (Figure 1).
Once I had managed to overcome my initial excitement at seeing the graphic, I became concerned about how it portrays the gray market. The idea of a ‘gray’ trade or market was introduced into criminological discussions of antiquities trading about 15 years ago. There was some confusion about the concept until it was systematized by Simon Mackenzie and Donna Yates (2019), who identified three possible usages:
Mixed streams of supply. Legally-obtained and illegally-obtained antiquities sold on the open market cannot be distinguished because of undisclosed provenance. An antiquity with an undisclosed provenance is regarded as gray, possibly on the market legally (white) or illegally (black).
Changing status of individual objects passing through trafficking networks. An illegally-obtained antiquity can be cleaned through time and space as it moves through jurisdictions up the trading chain for sale on the open market. So although its sale is technically legal, the antiquity might still be considered illicit, having been subject to an illegal transaction at some point in its trading history. Legally white but ethically black – gray.
Neutralization and the graying of the moral psychological processes of engagement. Actors justify or neutralize their engagements with illegally-obtained antiquities by appealing to a greater common good. Thus their engagement can be considered somewhere between good and bad – gray.
The Rand report recognizes Mackenzie & Yates (1) when it says:
Although illicit drugs, for example, are primarily sold on the black market because of their near universal illegality and strong law enforcement action against them, illicit antiquities can be advertised and sold through more-visible channels because it is often difficult to prove an individual item’s illegality (Rand 2020: xiii).
Unfortunately, the report doesn’t use this definition for defining its own gray market quadrants, deciding instead that:
… illegal items are sold relatively openly and, conversely, legal transactions may be conducted in private. These two cases are classified as gray market transactions (Rand 2020: 63).
While Mackenzie and Yates focused upon the status of the object (1 & 2) or actor (3), the Rand report has looked instead at market circumstances:
Illegal transactions conducted overtly
Legal transactions conducted covertly
Thus the Rand report has defined and portrayed the ‘gray market’ differently to most established usage in the literature dealing with the antiquities trade. This is not necessarily a problem, as the report’s definition might better suit its own purposes, but it does threaten to cause confusion if the graphic is used unwittingly by others to depict what is usually understood to be the gray antiquities market, when it does nothing of the sort (and doesn’t claim to). Having said that, it is not clear to me anyway why the two quadrants are marked gray. Their grayness does not feature in the associated analyses of market structure and appears superfluous.
Prompted by this gray mood to look more closely at the graphic, I began to think there are some deeper problems. It shows the antiquities market straddling the line between legal and illegal, though firmly placed on the overt side of the plot. While it is true that many antiquities are offered for sale openly, either at traditional bricks-and-mortar establishments such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s or on electronic platforms such as eBay, many more transactions, legal or illegal and often high-value, occur privately – in other words covertly. So, for an accurate representation of the antiquities market, the defining circle would need to be expanded outwards into the covert side of the plot (Figure 2). That would have the disadvantage of suggesting visually but inaccurately that the antiquities trade is much larger than the drugs trade, which is clearly not the case, and something the Rand report is rightly concerned not to imply.
Rand figure 4.11 (Figure 1 here) is used to argue that antiquities are not sold on the Darknet because they are not generally sold covertly on the black market. Unfortunately, they are. They are routinely transacted covertly and illegally. The 2010 Hobby Lobby private (covert) purchase in the United Arab Emirates of looted Iraqi antiquities offers just one example. There are many more. Most of the source trade in countries of origin is covert and illegal. It is true that antiquities are not traded on the Darknet, but it is not because they are not traded covertly and illegally as the graphic suggests.
Perhaps I am being unfair. In its introduction, explaining Figure S1, the report states:
We first conceptualized the antiquities market in relation to other illicit markets by considering it in terms of two characteristics: the openness versus secrecy of the transactions and their relative legality or illegality. Viewed in these terms, the differences between the illicit antiquities trade and drug or weapon trafficking is more clearly evident (Rand 2020: xiii).
This introductory explanation gives the clear impression that the graphic is meant to describe the antiquities market in its entirety, which is what I initially thought. Later, however, when the graphic is used to analyse market structure, as in Figure 1 here, the report states it is a “structural analysis of online markets”, presumably not including the bricks-and-mortar trade. Almost by definition, antiquities sold online are sold overtly, and perhaps there is no need to sell them covertly, as the report states (page xx). But that doesn’t mean that no antiquities are sold covertly. But looking more closely still, there is also confusion over what market exactly the graphic is meant to be depicting – source or destination? In countries such as Syria and Iraq, antiquities sales are illegal and mostly covert. Even when antiquities are offered for sale on platforms such as Facebook, it is in closed groups open only to vetted access and further limited by the use of a local language (in this case Arabic), and as the report notes (page xx) actual transactions take place covertly, often using encrypted messenger apps such as WhatsApp. An alternative characterisation would place this source market in the covert-illegal quadrant (Figure 3).
On the destination market, Facebook isn’t a major platform for marketing antiquities. As the report states, ‘auctions and online storefronts dominate’, where illegally-obtained antiquities can be sold on the open market. On the graphic, this market would be placed in the overt-illegal quadrant (Figure 4).
The point to be made here is that when travelling from source to destination, antiquities transition across quadrants because of the gray trade, in the sense of Mackenzie & Yates (1), whereby provenances are suppressed and invented so that antiquities are not identifiably illegal by the time they appear on the open market (Figure 5).
Another cause of initial confusion for me was how ‘legality’ could be a continuous variable – surely it is a binary variable: a transaction can be legal or illegal, but not ‘just about legal’, or ‘tending to the illegal’ etc. But having sourced the graphic back as far as 2006 to a paper by H. Brinton Milward and Jörg Raab (2006: 335, figure 1; reproduced here as Figure 6), I think I understand it better. Their idea was to characterise dark and bright networks in terms of their overall legality and visibility, and the Rand report seems to be doing likewise for markets instead of networks, or markets conceived as networks.
That observation does raise an interesting question, however. Could the transaction space be used to plot objects instead of networks? Could it be used to plot the progress of a single antiquity, thereby showing in detail how the gray trade operates? On Figure 7, I have plotted the known biography of the Gilgamesh Dream tablet using six real and one hypothetical transactions.
T1. Sometime before 2001, the tablet was looted in Iraq and bought in Jordan covertly by a dealer who must have recognised it to have been on the market illegally.
T2. In 2003, a US dealer visited London and bought the tablet covertly from the Jordanian dealer. The US dealer must also have recognised the tablet to have been obtained illegally, or at least strongly suspected it to be the case, as he invented a fake provenance in the shape of a letter stating that the tablet had been sold in San Francisco in 1981.
T3. In 2007, the US dealer sold the tablet covertly to another US dealer, along with the newly invented provenance to show that it was ‘clean’. At that point, the tablet was grayed, with its true, illegal provenance suppressed – an example of Mackenzie & Yates (1).
T4. Later in 2007, still in the United States, the second US dealer offered the tablet for sale overtly in a sales catalogue, accompanied by the new provenance.
T5. In 2014, the then owner of the tablet sold it to Hobby Lobby through a private (covert) sale arranged by Christie’s auction house in London. Depending upon what had happened to the tablet between 2007 and 2014, and what jurisdictions it had passed through, it might have been on the market in London legally, through with a fraudulent provenance – an example of Mackenzie & Yates (2). That remains to be determined in court, and that is the problem of the gray market. It is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the exact legal status of an object offered for sale.
T6. Hobby Lobby put the tablet on display in the Museum of the Bible, but subsequently recognising that it had probably been taken illegally from Iraq, agreed to return it.
? T7. In the unlikely event that Iraq decides to sell the tablet, the transaction would be open and legal.
This object biography shows how the illegally-obtained tablet was grayed through the invention of a fake provenance and also possibly by its (hypothetical) movement through jurisdictions and the passage of time. Time is a crucial element here. As time passes, and illegal actions diminish into the distancing past, gray antiquities slowly fade to white.
Another problem with the original graphic is that it doesn’t take adequate account of provenance. Provenance is a defining feature of the antiquities trade in a way that it isn’t for the drugs trade, as the Gilgamesh Dream tablet biography shows. Unfortunately, provenance adds another variable that cannot be included in the two-dimensional transaction space. But if the space is constructed differently using visibility and provenance as its defining axes, binary legality can then be indicated using symbol colour. In Figure 8, I have indicated illegal objects with a known provenance as black, legal objects with a known provenance as white, and objects of undisclosed provenance as gray. Gray objects are transacted covertly and overtly. White (legal) objects are also transacted covertly (privately) and overtly. Black objects, that is to say objects known to be on the market illegally, can only be sold covertly (unless by someone with a prison-wish). These might seem trivial observations, but they demonstrate a fundamental truth of the antiquities trade, which is that it is not possible to talk about a black market, at least not in this transaction space. The market can be invisible, in that legal (white) or illegal (black) antiquities can be sold covertly; or gray in the sense of Mackenzie & Yates (1) in that legal and illegal antiquities can be sold (overtly and covertly) with an undisclosed or false provenance; or white, in that legal (white) antiquities can be sold overtly. The policy challenge is to force a white market by improving provenance provision, as shown in Figure 9.
Although I was initially excited by the Rand graphic, I found much to disagree with, yet disagreement in itself has been a stimulating exercise. The Rand report has done us all a great service by suggesting how such simple graphics might be used profitably to explore the structure of the antiquities market and its structural relations with other markets. I look forward to seeing more.
(Notice I didn’t call this post ‘fifty shades of gray’. I am better than that).
Mackenzie, Simon and Donna Yates (2016). What is grey about the ‘grey market’ in antiquities, in J. Beckert and M. Dewey (eds), The Architecture of Illegal Markets: Towards an Economic Sociology of Illegality in the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milward, H. Brinton and Jörg Raab (2006). Dark networks as organizational problems: elements of a theory, International Public Management Journal 9: 333-360.
Rand (2020). Sargent, Matthew, James V. Marrone, Alexandra Evans, Bilyana Lilly, Erik Nemeth, Stephen Dalzell, Tracking and Disrupting the Illicit Antiquities Trade with Open-source Data. Santa Monica: Rand.
Suddenly, it seems, the world’s cultural heritage is plagued
by coronavirus. It is everywhere. I am asked weekly about how the virus will
exacerbate archaeological looting. (How should I know? There is nothing evident
in my home office where I am quarantined and writing incisive blog commentary).
IGOs and NGOs are hosting seminars and lectures about the virus. Funding agencies
are announcing emergency grants and interventions. Meanwhile, what are perhaps
more serious threats to cultural heritage are being ignored.
The Syrian economy is in meltdown. The brutal civil war which has now been dragging on for nearly ten years has taken its economic toll and the deteriorating situation in neighbouring Lebanon has made things worse. Syria’s tottering and fragmenting economy is due to receive another blow today (17 June 2020) when the United States imposes sanctions under its Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019. This act is ostensibly aimed at protecting Syrian civilians by destabilising the Assad regime and halting its violent attacks on human lives and human rights. The sanctions target Assad’s financial supporters outside Syria with a view to weakening his military and economic infrastructure. But as is usual with sanctions of this sort, ordinary people will suffer. The value of the Syrian pound has collapsed by 70 per cent since April, inflation is rampant, and the prices of food and other essentials are skyrocketing. Unprecedented protests have been reported in towns that up until now have been strongly supportive of Assad. It is a humanitarian disaster, but one that is unfolding behind the obscuring media veil of coronavirus.
As poverty deepens in Syria, the consequences for cultural
heritage are all too predictable – more looting and theft. Despite decades of
crisis-led policy interventions, with coronavirus being only the latest of a
long line, the international community has failed to control and reduce market
demand for antiquities and other cultural objects. Yet market demand is the
ultimate driver of looting and theft wherever, whenever and however it happens.
Instead of reducing demand, myopic policy initiatives continually aim at diminishing
market supply (by trying unsuccessfully to protect cultural heritage on-the-ground)
and jump from one “emergency” to the next. In fact, policy-makers seem to like “emergencies”.
Probably because it easier to grab political attention and secure funding for
short-term “emergency” actions than it is for long, drawn-out (though
eventually effective) measures aimed at reducing market demand. Policy is
failing because it is reactive, not proactive, and is tackling symptoms, not
causes. While policy-makers (and funders) are looking the other way at
coronavirus, Syrian heritage looks set to suffer further because of this failure.
Close to the heart of any successful antiquities trafficking
racket lurks a restorer/conservator, sometimes more than one. Restorers repair
and clean antiquities in such a way as to improve their appearance and
durability, and thus desirability. Removing dirt or other accretions from the
surface of an antiquity exposes its original finish and detail, while in the
process uncovering any evidence of past repairs or forged modifications. Such
work helps establish the identity, condition, authenticity and quality of a
piece, while improving its appearance and aesthetic appeal, all important
factors for determining value and setting price. But restoration work of this
type might also destroy evidence of looting or theft. It could involve fixing
together a recently broken object, perhaps a stolen one broken into pieces to
expedite transport or passage through customs. Thus while the ostensible
purpose of restoration is to stabilise and curate an antiquity, at the same
time it improves the value of an antiquity, promotes its saleability, and might
even remove evidence of theft or illegal trade.
Restorers do not often figure in criminal cases relating to antiquities trafficking. In December 2016, a criminal complaint filed by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office against New York Asian Art dealer Nancy Wiener identified two unnamed restorers as ‘co-conspirators’, though no charges were pressed. It was timely then on 8 July 2019, when the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges relating to antiquities trafficking against Subhash Kapoor and seven alleged co-conspirators, including restorers Neil Perry Smith in the United Kingdom and Richard Salmon in New York. The complaint contains a wealth of information about the activities of these restorers, with Kapoor sending metal objects to Perry Smith and stone objects to Salmon, an indication perhaps of Kapoor’s estimation of their respective talents. Of course, a criminal charge isn’t in itself definitive proof of wrongdoing, and the named restorers remain innocent until proven guilty. But looking through the complaint at what is revealed about Salmon, for example, it is not hard to see why charges were levelled at him. Multiple invoices provide information about his services, which include such actions as ‘cleaning’, ‘picking out detail’, ‘bringing out the quality of the stone’, and ‘mounting’. All this sounds innocent enough, the normal bread-and-butter work of a restorer. But what about when he claimed payment for ‘picking out details with “ancient earth”’ and ‘touching out “new breaks”’? Why would he add ‘ancient earth’ to a piece, and was he not suspicious about the cause of ‘new breaks’, and breaks more generally?
In early 2006, for example, Kapoor bought from Chet Ram Yadav in
India and took possession in New York of a second-century BC sandstone Mahakoka
Devata or Yakshi (Bharhut Pillar).
The pillar had been stolen from the home of an Indian resident in July 2004 and
appears to have been broken into four pieces for shipment to New York. Kapoor
valued it at $15 million. On 2 May 2006, Salmon charged $11,500 for
reassembling the four pieces by drilling and joining them with dowels,
subsequently filling and disguising joins, including making up missing areas of
the bottom, touching out scratches and bringing up the lustre of stone. On 5
January 2012 DHS-HSI agents seized the Pillar from New York storage.
In autumn 2006, Kapoor bought from Chet Ram Yadav in India and took
possession in New York of nine objects stolen in August 2006 from the Vishnu
Varaha Temple in Kari Talai, Madhya Pradesh, India. They included a pair of
eleventh-century, sandstone celestial Apsaras (Pair of Apsaras), originally joined as one piece though separated
and damaged by the time they reached New York. Kapoor valued them at $95,000
each. On 9 October 2006, Salmon charged $1,700 for making up missing sections,
cleaning, touching out ‘new breaks’, picking out details and enhancing colour
of the stone. But he repaired and prepared for sale each Apsara separately and
failed to restore the original integrity (and thus appearance) of the piece. On
26 July 2012, the Apsaras were in storage in New York though their present
whereabouts are unknown.
In repairing broken objects and more generally patching and
cleaning, knowingly or not Salmon’s work might have been important for hiding
evidence of theft and illegal trade and improving saleability, but in relative
terms he does not appear to have been very well paid for his services. As can
be seen from the table below, the money charged by Salmon for his work was very
little compared to that made or expected to be made by Kapoor. Altogether, for
24 jobs on material valued by Kapoor at approximately $31 million, Salmon
charged only $84,875, or 0.27 per cent of the material’s prospective retail
value. Given the element of risk involved for Salmon, working as he was on
suspect material, he seems not to have factored the risk into his pricing
strategy. Perhaps he was unaware of the dubious provenance of the material he
was working on. Perhaps it was simply because a sense of professional impunity
encouraged him to minimise his risk assessment. Remembering that before Kapoor
restorers had not figured in criminal indictments, perhaps Salmon simply
thought that it would never happen to him. Well, it has now. Given that Salmon finds
himself named on a criminal complaint, he might regret charging such relatively
small sums of money. Perhaps other restorers are taking note and adjusting
their prices accordingly.
Nevertheless, even if Salmon was underselling himself, he was clearly
doing good business with Kapoor. The prices tabulated above are only for a
small number of objects. The complaint contains details of 15 separate invoices
over a nine-year period, tabulated below, each invoice itemising a larger
number of objects than described in the complaint. Looking at the invoices, it
is also clear that they represent only a part of the total work performed by
Salmon for Kapoor in any one year. The 14 November 2003 invoice, for example,
also presents unpaid claims dated back to 5 September and 15 September totalling
$5,305, in addition to even older unsettled bill of $17,390, though presumably
in November still for work conducted in 2003. The invoices for these claims are
not available for inspection. So in 2003, Salmon must have charged Kapoor more
than the $46,110 evident on invoices, perhaps much more. In 2006, the year for
which there are most invoices, Salmon charged a minimum of $39,655. Still not a
large sum of money for a New York-based business though.
12 June 2002
16 September 2002
5 December 2002
13 March 2003
14 November 2003
+ bills of 5 Sept and 15 Sept totalling $5,305, plus old bill
10 November 2004
7 September 2005
18 February 2006
2 May 2006
20 September 2006
9 October 2006
8 February 2007
9 March 2007
15 March 2008
21 April 2009
Restorers are crucial to the ongoing health of the antiquities market.
Whether they know it or not, their work effectively launders trafficked
antiquities and facilitates their entry into legitimate commerce. Having said
that, most restorers do not work on trafficked or even suspect antiquities.
Those that do must comprise only a handful, but that is all it takes, and they
have in the past been able to believe themselves out of the reach of the law.
The Kapoor complaint changes all that. It remains to be seen whether or not the
charges will stick, but the very fact that restorers are named must send a
chill warning through the profession. It is time for them to clean up their
game. It just isn’t worth it. A more hostile environment for restorers will
reduce their willingness to work with suspect material and should act to
improve their due diligence. Upping their game in this way will make it much
more difficult for dealers to bring trafficked antiquities to market. Even if the
charges against Salmon don’t stick, by naming a pair of restorers, the
complaint has highlighted a potential weakness of the antiquities trade and shown
how to exploit it.
I recently came across the text of a lecture delivered by International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art (IADAA) chairman Vincent Geerling in 2016. In it, there are comments about some previously published work of mine:
The most bizarre figures about the size of the illicit market are taken for granted and quoted by government officials without even thinking critically about their validity. What is worse, these false figures form the basis of draconian measures against ‘the trade’ and result in the misdirection of the limited resources of law enforcement agencies such as yourselves.
This ‘multibillion illegal trade’ with its ‘invisible mafia structures’ has to be halted, officials shout from the rooftops. The urgency is underlined by the alleged size of the illicit market: Claims of $2-3 billion followed by $6-8 billion have done the rounds, while the winner is der Spiegel, who in August 2015 claimed $7-15 billion, quoting UNESCO as the source for their fake figures in order to give them credibility.
The truth is that nobody knows the size of the illicit market. So IADAA asked Ivan Macquisten, a journalist, to find the primary source of the $2 billion.
He initially traced it back to a 2000 report by Brodie, Watson and Dooley, “Stealing History: The Illicit Trade in Cultural Material”, which quoted the figure and gave as its source an article in The Independent newspaper, ‘Great sale of the century’, by Geraldine Norman dating back to November 24, 1990. However, Ivan has now secured a copy of that article and it gives no figure at all. Brodie now publicly regrets ever quoting the (non-existent) figure, which may well be the source for the FBI’s figures.
So nobody knows the size of the illicit market, yet senior politicians in the United States continue to quote discredited figures in the hundreds of millions for the value of the trade in looted Syrian objects as justification for introducing news laws banning the import of even legitimate items and calling for further measures.
It looks like I am being blamed here for setting in motion claims that the antiquities trade is worth billions of dollars annually. But this is not what was actually said in Stealing History (2000; and the authors are Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole and Peter Watson, not Brodie, Watson and Dooley), which on page 23 states:
Geraldine Norman has estimated that the illicit trade in antiquities, world-wide, may be as much as $2 billion a year; other estimates have ranged down to $150 million. As already pointed out, because the trade is clandestine, reliable data is hard to find.
we were trying to do here was to set out a range of previously published value estimates,
from high to low, with a view to coming up with something more accurate – presumably something in-between. We were not suggesting the illicit
trade should be valued annually at $2 billion, or for that matter at $150
million. We were not trying to exaggerate the value of the trade. We were
simply making the point that previously published estimates were subject to an
alarming degree of variation and were inherently unreliable. After examining
problems with various data sources and trying but largely failing to arrive at
a more accurate figure, we concluded on page 25 that there was a need for ‘more
reliable statistics to give usable information on the size of the trade’. Regrettably,
twenty years later, the need for more reliable statistics remains acute and
organisations such as the IADAA have done nothing to help. Given that we were
criticising the unreliability of previously published estimates, I don’t regret
that we quoted the figure of $2 billion, no more than I regret quoting the
figure of $150 million. The whole point was to demonstrate the broad range of
monetary estimates based on unpublished if not non-existent data. I do regret
that many reporters and others since then have ignored the argument about absent
data and unfounded statistics and continued to claim multi-billion-dollar sums
without offering any supporting evidence. I believe Geerling and myself are in
broad agreement on that point at least.
Geerling said the IADAA had asked Ivan Macquisten to find the primary source of the $2 billion claim, and that Macquisten had traced it back to me. I assume this is Macquisten writing on the Antiquities Dealers’ Association (ADA) website, where he identifies one original source as the:
2000 report by Jenny Dooley, Neil Brodie and Peter Watson of the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research in the University of Cambridge, Stealing History: The Illicit Trade in Cultural Material, which references Independent article, Great sale of the century, by Geraldine Norman on November 24, 1990. The 2000 report also acknowledged the true value might be much less. Also thought to be the basis for FBI figure, according to Oxford Archaeologist Emma Cunliffe. However, the Norman article does not mention such a figure (ADA n.d.).
Dooley again? Come on guys, get it right, it was Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole and Peter Watson. But I digress. Macquisten does recognise here that we understood the true value of the illicit trade was likely to be less than $2 billion, though he seems to have forgotten that qualification in a paper he has recently published entitled ‘Fake news and the antiquities trade’ (Macquisten 2019). From the title, you might imagine he was talking about IADAA or ADA trade statistics, of which more below. But no, he was tackling what he considers to be exaggerated value assessments and dismissing them as fake news. In particular, he was dissecting an impact assessment (IA) published by the European Commission (2017). Among other things, the IA states that:
According to studies, the total financial value of the illegal antiquities and art trade is larger than any other area of international crime except arms trafficking and narcotics and has been estimated at $3 to 6 billion yearly.
IA references the ‘$3 to 6 billion yearly’ statistic to a paper written by Lisa
Borodkin in 1995, who in turn referenced other sources. Macquisten chased those
sources down and quite rightly dismissed them as inadequate. But then in his
paper he went on to say this:
Also cited in the same set of footnotes in the IA is Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole and Peter Watson’s 2000 report, Stealing History: The Illicit Trade in Cultural Material, which does quote a similar figure. On page 23, it states: “Geraldine Norman has estimated that the illicit trade in antiquities, world-wide, may be as much as $2 billion a year.” On page 60, under the relevant footnote, it gives the source as follows: Norman G., Great Sale of the Century. Independent, November 24, 1990. However, the Norman article mentions no figure whatsoever.
The ‘set of footnotes’ referred to is on page 12 of the IA, with the particular footnote referencing page 16 of Stealing History in relation to the IA’s statement that there are ‘Links between the antiquities trade and drug, wildlife and arms trafficking’. Well, Stealing History does not actually mention wildlife or arms, but the real point here is that the IA is not referencing Stealing History in relation to its ‘$3 to 6 Billion yearly’ claim, so why did Macquisten mention it? Notice he drags up the Norman misattribution again. He is right, of course, the attribution is wrong. Mea culpa. But the misdirected attribution does not invalidate the substance of the argument Stealing History was making about phantom data and unverifiable statistics. He could easily have contacted me to check the facts, but found it easier or more convenient to keep talking about a misattribution. But back in 2000, when we were writing Stealing History, what exactly were the facts? Macquisten himself has identified the 1993 claim by Caroline Wakeford of the Art Loss Register that the worldwide market in stolen art was worth about $3 billion. She in turn was possibly quoting an estimate made around the same time by Scotland Yard that the annual value of stolen art worldwide was £3 billion (Palmer 1995: 3). Art is a broad category, probably including antiques and paintings, but a few years later, writing specifically about the illicit trade in cultural objects, Maria Kouroupas stated that ‘according to Interpol, it now ranks with drugs and arms as one of the three most serious illicit international trading activities, valued at approximately $4.5 billion annually’ (Kouroupas 1998). In 2005, Kate Fitz Gibbon continued pointing the finger at Interpol when she said:
Like many popular myths, the billion-dollar figure has been repeated so often that its origin is difficult to trace. So many citations claim to be based on an Interpol estimate produced in the late 1990s that Interpol has made the following statement: “We do not possess any figures which would enable us to claim that trafficking in cultural property is the third or fourth most common form of trafficking, although this is frequently mentioned at international conferences and in the media. In fact, it is very difficult to gain an exact idea of how many items of cultural property are stolen throughout the world and it is unlikely that there will ever be any accurate statistics.
for Fitz Gibbon at least, the billion-dollar figure had nothing to do with Stealing History.
IA goes on to footnote Stealing History
two more times. It references page 13 of Stealing
History in support of the statement that:
Foreign demand for illicit cultural goods provides local impoverished populations with a supplement to their meagre income (so-called ‘subsistence digging’). The chain of supply starts with common thieves and tomb robbers in source countries, who often destroy the archaeological context and damage the objects themselves while excavating. For relatively small amounts of money, they sell the objects to professional dealers and middlemen, who transport the goods towards final destinations.
actually did say something like that. But on page 14 the IA also footnotes Stealing History to support its claim
Multi-billion antiquities revenues are used by Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, to say nothing of more common drug smugglers dealing also in antiquities.
Al-Qaeda only came to general attention with the September 11 attacks in 2001, and I am not sure we had even heard of the organisation when we were writing Stealing History, we certainly didn’t mention it. Nor did we mention Hezbollah or the Taliban, nor did we imply that they were predating upon a multi-billion-dollar antiquities trade. Given the general debunking drift of his paper, I would have expected Macquisten to have taken down this misattribution and absolved us of any blame. But he didn’t. Why not? Instead we have only his observation about the erroneous Norman attribution in relation to an IA statement not actually referencing the Stealing History passage he is concerned about. To me, this looks like a piece of disingenuous argumentation, ostensibly aimed at making a factual criticism but in reality intended to discredit an authority (me). Mind you, having said all that, I agree with some of what Macquisten had to say. A state-of-the-art report prepared for the European Commission in 2017 should not have been inaccurately referencing publications that were 15 or 20 years old when more up-to-date material was available.
his paper, Macquisten went on to discuss a BBC World Service radio programme
broadcast in February 2019 entitled Zombie Statistics, in which he featured. Again
though, on the programme, Macquisten stated publicly that we now admit we got
the $2 billion figure wrong. We admit no such thing. It was not our figure to
get wrong. (In passing, he made a bit of a zombie claim of his own, saying
there is evidence of looted material from Syria and Iraq going to the Far East,
but without saying what the evidence is. It would be useful for the evidence to
be made public).
his 2016 lecture, Geerling continued that:
We have no idea about the real size of the illicit market, but what we do know is the size of the legitimate market. IADAA carried out research on the size of the market of 2013; the combined sales figures of dealers and auction houses in the entire western world. The result is a reliable figure of €150–200 million.
years earlier, the Antiquities Dealers Association (ADA) had estimated that
there was a ‘world turnover of classical antiquities of perhaps £200–300
million’ (ADA 2000: 56). In 2005, I think using a different data set, Arielle
Kozloff had arrived at a figure of around $100–200 million for the trade
worldwide (Kozloff 2005: 187). The three studies are tabulated below.
we are expected to believe that the value of the antiquities trade diminished
over the 13-year period 2000–2013? It doesn’t seem likely. The published
figures are meaningless, usually based on phantom data that are never published
or made available for independent verification. Nevertheless, looking at these
figures now with fresh eyes, the reality of a $1–2 billion annual trade does begin
to look more believable. They value the trade in what are generally called classical
antiquities, from the ancient cultures of Europe, North Africa and West Asia,
and exclude Internet sales. If equivalent figures were made available for the
trades in American, African, Asian and Islamic antiquities, together with
ancient coins and manuscripts, and Internet sales, they would quite likely tip
the value of total trade over the $1 billion mark and perhaps even take it up
towards $2 billion. And notice I said ‘trade’ here, not ‘illegal trade’.
It would be easy for trade organisations such as the ADA and IADAA to disprove multi-billion-dollar claims simply by publishing their own data sets and making them available for public scrutiny. All this reference chasing and debunking should not be necessary. But they have consistently failed to do so and have continued instead to engage in tilting at straw men. Remember, it is now 20 years since Stealing History was published, ample time for the trade to have conducted and published a systematic financial survey, especially if they are so concerned about the continuing dissemination of exaggerated value estimates. The IADAA (2013) has published a summary breakdown of its overall figure, which is a start, though it still falls far short of a full data description which is what is required.
did not invent the claim that the antiquities trade should be valued at
billions of dollars worldwide. In fact, it was trying to expose the uncertainty
of those claims a decade or more before Geerling or Macquisten got in on the
act and it should be credited accordingly. Trade organisations spend a lot of
time trying to discredit the work of people such as myself, but never manage to
offer anything concrete in return to support their arguments. Until that does
happen, sceptics such as myself must be excused for regarding their efforts as
little more than fake news in return.
2000. Memorandum submitted by the Antiquities Dealers Association, in Cultural Property: Return and Illicit Trade,
Volume II, Minutes of Evidence. London: Stationery Office, 56-66.
n.d. Headline figures and misleading statistics relating to antiquities and the
Syrian crisis, ADA website.
2013. Summary of the IADAA research about the worldwide legitimate antiquities
market in 2013. Cultural Property News website.
Lisa, 1995. The economics of antiquities looting and a proposed legal
alternative, Columbia Law Review 95:
Neil, Jenny Doole and Peter Watson, 2000. Stealing
History. Cambridge: McDonald Institute.
Vincent, 2016. Collecting ancient art, an old tradition under attack, Cultural
Property News website.
Commission 2017. Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Import of Cultural Goods.
Gibbon, Kate, 2005. Editor’s note: the illicit trade – fact or fiction?, in
Kate Fitz Gibbon (ed.), Who Owns the
Past? New Brunswick: Rutgers, 179-182.
Maria P., 1998. Illicit trade in cultural objects, Conservation Perspectives, 13(1).
Arielle, 2005. The antiquities market: when, what, where, who, why … and how
much?, in Kate Fitz Gibbon (ed.), Who
Owns the Past? New Brunswick: Rutgers, 183-190.
Ivan, 2019. Fake news and the antiquities trade, Cahn’s Quarterly 2, 4-6.
Norman, 1995. Recovering stolen art, in Kathryn Walker Tubb (ed.), Antiquities Trade or Betrayed. London:
A few weeks ago, it was widely
reported that Greece would seek the return of the Parthenon Marbles as part of
any Brexit agreement (e.g. Barnes 2020). As with most news concerning Brexit,
these reports were transparently fake, arising from a sentence in a leaked EU document
stating that ‘the Parties should, consistently with Union rules, address
issues relating to the return or restitution of unlawfully removed cultural
objects to their countries of origin’ (Hickley 2020). This sentence is a clear reference to the UK’s
Brexit-related withdrawal from the requirements of EUDirective
2014/60 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory
of a member state.
Countries such as Italy and Greece are understandably concerned that the UK
withdrawal will help open up the UK market to stolen antiquities and other cultural
objects. One obvious solution would be for the UK and EU member states that
have not already done so to sign up to the 1995 Unidroit Convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural objects,
thereby bringing all countries together within a common legal framework. Italy and
Greece are already parties to the Unidroit Convention, though not all EU
countries are, and the UK could take the lead
in pushing for this solution. So come on Dominic Cummings, if you are reading
this blog (and you should be), start thinking about creating a Brexit bonus for
the world’s cultural heritage.
On 12 March 2019, the European Parliament adopted EU Regulation 2019/880 on the import of cultural goods, which is intended to control the import of cultural objects into the European Union (EP 2019). The European Commission first announced the proposed Regulation on 13 July 2017, as part of the EU’s 2016 action plan to ‘strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism’ (EC 2017a). The focus on terrorist financing was made clear in the press release:
Commission First Vice President Frans Timmermans said: ‘Money is oxygen to terrorist organisations such as Daesh. We are taking action to cut off each of their sources of financing. This includes the trade of cultural goods, as terrorists derive funding from the looting of archaeological sites and the illegal sale of cultural objects. By preventing them from entering the EU, we can help dry up this source of income’.
The press release
went on to state that:
At the moment, the EU applies prohibitions on goods from Iraq and Syria but there is no general EU framework for the import of cultural goods. Current rules can be exploited by unscrupulous exporters and importers who can use the profits to fund illegal activities such as terrorism.
Background information presented with the press release also highlighted the problem of terrorist financing and emphasised it would be the intention of the new Regulation to reduce such financing by stopping the import of looted and trafficked cultural objects into the EU (EC 2017b):
Recent reports have also shown that valuable artworks, sculptures and archaeological artefacts are being sold and imported into the EU from certain non-EU countries, with those profits potentially used to finance terrorist activities. For example, two Syrian friezes that may have been intended for criminal gain were seized at Roissy airport, France last year.
The European Commission is now responding to numerous calls for action from the other EU institutions and national governments by proposing measures to counter the illicit trafficking of cultural goods from non-EU countries more effectively. The proposal adopted today is also foreseen in the Commission Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing that was presented in December 2016 and aims to disrupt the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations by targeting their capacity to raise funds.
Paragraph 1 of the
Regulation’s preamble explains its purpose in responding to terrorism:
In light of the Council Conclusions of 12 February 2016 on the fight against the financing of terrorism, the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 2 February 2016 on an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing and Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, common rules on trade with third countries should be adopted so as to ensure the effective protection against illicit trade in cultural goods and against their loss or destruction, the preservation of humanity’s cultural heritage and the prevention of terrorist financing and money laundering through the sale of pillaged cultural goods to buyers in the Union.
Article 1(1) of
the Regulation confirms:
This Regulation sets out the conditions for the introduction of cultural goods and the conditions and procedures for the import of cultural goods for the purpose of safeguarding humanity’s cultural heritage and preventing the illicit trade in cultural goods, in particular where such illicit trade could contribute to terrorist financing.
Thus in its intention
and substance the 2019 Regulation is explicitly conceived as an instrument to
combat the trade of cultural objects for financing terrorism. Unfortunately, it
looks to have fallen short of that goal, largely because of the anachronistic
and now flawed categorisation of cultural property which it inherited from the
1970 UNESCO Convention. Paragraph 7 of the Regulation’s preamble states that:
Many third countries and most Member States are familiar with the definitions used in the Unesco Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property signed in Paris on 14 November 1970 (‘the 1970 Unesco Convention’) to which a significant number of Member States are a party, and in the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects signed in Rome on 24 June 1995. For that reason the definitions used in this Regulation are based on those definitions.
Thus the Regulation
adopted the 49-year-old 1970 UNESCO categorisation of cultural property for
reasons of ‘familiarity’, rather than design a new, more technically precise
system of categories – one more suited perhaps to the Regulation’s intended
purpose of tackling terrorist financing. The categories of cultural objects
subject to control by the Regulation are set out in its Annex, which follows
the 1970 UNESCO Convention in making the distinction between (c) ‘products of archaeological excavations’,
and (e) ‘antiquities, such as coins
and engraved seals’. This distinction is important because legislatively these
two categories are treated differently from one another.
Article 4 of the Regulation applies to ‘products of archaeological
excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological
discoveries on land or underwater’ and ‘elements of artistic or historical
monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered’ (including
liturgical items and statues), all more than 250 years old. An importer must apply for an import license, subject to
certain reservations providing proof of licit export of material from the country
of origin. The importer should supply relevant supporting documentation, such
as export licenses etc.
Article 5 applies to all other
cultural objects, including ‘antiquities, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals’, more than 200 years old. It
requires only that the importer submit to customs a signed
statement (affidavit) certifying that subject to certain reservations the material
was legally exported from the country of origin, accompanied by a standardised
document describing the object in detail to enable ‘risk control’.
In other words, while Article 4 controls the import of archaeological products by means of a
licensing system, Article 5 only documents
the import of antiquities. Furthermore, while Article 4 applies to
archaeological products of any value, Article 5 only applies to antiquities
valued at more than 18,000 Euros per item. In effect, because of this monetary
threshold, virtually all ‘antiquities’ are excluded from any requirement to
document through importer statement.
There is strong evidence in Syria of criminals and terrorists targeting what in the Regulation are termed ‘antiquities’ in the form ancient coins and jewellery. On 16 May, 2015, when US Special Forces raided the Syrian compound of Abu Sayyaf, head of the ISIL Diwan al Rikaz (Ministry of Natural Resources and Minerals, including its Antiquities Division), many of the antiquities recovered from his possession were coins from Syria and Iraq, together with electronic images of gold coins and jewellery on his computer (US 2016). Ethnographic reporting from Idlib Governorate in Syria has highlighted how metal-detectors are used searching for coins and other small objects (Brodie and Sabrine 2018), while the importance of coins is also reflected in reports of seizures in Turkey (Myers and Kulish 2016). The ATHAR investigation into the use of Facebook for trafficking cultural objects emphasises that ‘coins represented the most frequently offered artifact in posts’ (Al-Azm and Paul 2019: 37, 38 figures 43-46). Thus what evidence there is for the use of cultural objects in terrorist financing points towards the particular importance of ancient coins, which are not subject to the Article 4 licensing requirement of the regulation and mostly too low-value to be subject to the statement requirement of Article 5. The door is left wide open for the undocumented import and sale of ancient coins and other antiquities that might finance terrorism –expressly counter to the intention of the Regulation.
Other than the
familiarity of the 1970 UNESCO categorisation, why ‘antiquities more than one
hundred years old’ should be treated differently to ‘products of archaeological
excavations’ is not explained in the Regulation (or in the 1970 UNESCO
Convention), even though antiquities are commonly understood to be ancient archaeological
objects. The distinction between archaeological products and antiquities is
there already in Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, perhaps because at
the time the 1970 Convention was being drafted, the term ‘antiquity’ was being
used in some national laws to denote an old rather than an ancient object
(O’Keefe 2017: 125). A better term today might be ‘antique’. But the specific
inclusion of coins in the category antiquities encourages or at least enables
an interpretation that ancient coins should be considered separately from
products of archaeological excavations.
threshold imposed by the Regulation on ‘antiquities, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved
seals’ seems to carry over the distinction between important and, by
extension, unimportant objects that was established in Article 1 of the 1970
UNESCO Convention. The idea that some cultural property is more important than
other cultural property encourages a view that objects of aesthetic or other
cultural (and thus monetary) value are more deserving of protection than
objects that in themselves are of less aesthetic or cultural value. It is only
a short step then to deciding that important objects are more deserving of
trade control than unimportant objects. But privileging the ‘primacy of the
object’ in this way overlooks or ignores the damage caused to cultural heritage
by the large-scale clandestine excavation of small objects such as coins and
jewellery, which can be massively destructive, as satellite images of Syrian
archaeological sites suggest. When traded in large enough numbers, and they
are, they can generate substantial income for criminals and terrorists.
Thus, it is
questionable to what extent a legal instrument intending to protect cultural
heritage in situ should distinguish
between important and unimportant objects, as seems to be the case in the
Regulation with its system of control for archaeological products but only
documentation (at best) for antiquities. This is a serious problem if, as seems
probable, coins and other small objects included in the category antiquities
are a primary source of terrorist financing. By failing to exert control over
their import into the EU the Regulation has failed in its expressed purpose of
combatting terrorist financing.
The reasons for
this failure are not hard to discern. First, the Regulation was drafted in
light of a very poor evidence base. It was conceived in reaction to public
concern about the activities of Da’esh in Syria and Iraq and particularly by
widespread reports of Daesh’s control and profiting from the trade in cultural objects.
Yet it remains the case that there has been no good quality or reliable research
conducted into the problem of the trade in cultural objects funding terrorism,
and in the absence of such research the legislators probably had to rely upon
unreliable and sensationalist media reporting, with its misleading reports of
‘treasures’ and ‘artworks’ – little more than guesswork in fact. Second, it is
questionable to what extent in 2019 the 1970 UNESCO categorisation is fit for
purpose. Familiarity is all very well, but the categorisation is now fifty
years old and as the Regulation shows it can cripple more forward-looking
international legislation. In fact, it might not be too much to claim that
unless it is changed or even abandoned it will come to constitute a
debilitating ‘heart of confusion’ for any future laws aiming to control the
trade in archaeological products/antiquities.
Al-Azm, Amr and Katie Paul, 2019. Facebook’s Black Market in Antiquities. Trafficking, Terrorism and War
Crimes. Antiquities Trafficking and Heritage Anthropology Research (ATHAR)
Brodie, Neil and Isber Sabrine, 2018. The illegal
excavation and trade of Syrian cultural objects: a view from the ground. Journal of Field Archaeology 43, 74–84.
EC 2017a. Security Union: Cracking down on the illegal
import of cultural goods used to finance terrorism. Press release 13 July.
2017b. Questions and Answers on the
illegal import of cultural goods used to finance terrorism. Press release 13
EP 2019. Regulation on the Import of Cultural Goods.
Myers, Steven Lee and Nicholas Kulish, 2016. “‘Broken
system’ allows ISIS to profit from looted antiquities”, New York Times, January 9.
O’Keefe, Patrick, 2017. Protecting Cultural Objects: Before and After 1970. Leicester:
Institute of Art and Law.
US 2016. United States of America v. One gold ring with
carved gemstone, an asset of ISIL, discovered on electronic media of Abu
Sayyaf, President of ISIL Antiquities Department; one gold coin featuring Antoninus
Pius, an asset of ISIL, discovered on electronic media of Abu Sayyaf, President
of ISIL Antiquities Department; one gold coin featuring Emperor Hadrian
Augustus Caesar, an asset of ISIL, discovered on electronic media of Abu
Sayyaf, President Of ISIL Antiquities Department; one carved Neo-Assyrian stone
stela, an asset of ISIL, discovered on electronic media of Abu Sayyaf,
President of ISIL Antiquities Department, United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, 2016 (1:16-cv-02442),
In October 2011, New York-based Asian Art dealer Subhash
Kapoor was arrested in Germany and in July 2012 extradited to India where he awaits
trial facing criminal charges related to the theft and trafficking of
antiquities. At the time of his arrest, Kapoor was proprietor of the sales gallery
Art of the Past in New York City, dealing in cultural objects from a range of
South and Southeast Asian countries.
Starting in January 2012, the Department of Homeland
Security-Homeland Security Investigations (DHS-HSI) followed up Kapoor’s arrest
with a series of raids on his New York sales and storage premises, seizing business
records and a large number of antiquities thought to have been stolen and
trafficked. By April 2015, DHS-HSI had recovered 2,622 antiquities with a total
appraised value of $107.6 million (Mashberg 2015). On 8 July 2019, the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges related to
antiquities trafficking against Kapoor and seven alleged co-conspirators. The
complaint describes a series of offences starting at least by August 1986 with
the incorporation of Art of the Past and continuing until 2016. It alleges
Kapoor traded thousands of stolen antiquities with a total value exceeding $145
Based on documentation and other evidence recovered during
the DHS-HSI investigations, the meticulously detailed complaint contains a
wealth of information relating to Kapoor’s activities, which is primarily
reproduced in support of the charges brought against him, but which also casts light
on the operation of his business and the antiquities trade more generally. One
immediate point of interest is the evidence of price mark-ups between what
Kapoor paid for an object (cost price) and what he sold it for (selling price).
Leaving aside prices recorded on customs forms, which might be fraudulent, the
DHS-HSI was able to gain more reliable evidence of mark-ups from Kapoor’s
correspondence with his suppliers, sometimes supplemented by informant
To start with, the complaint provides prices for the
purchase and sale by Kapoor of three objects. The complaint also provides
Kapoor’s valuations of objects not sold by the time of the DHS-HSI raids.
Comparison of the actual selling prices of the three sold objects with Kapoor’s
pre-sale valuations of them allows an assessment to be made of the accuracy of
Kapoor’s valuations. The valuations can then be used as proxy selling prices
for several other unsold pieces and allow the calculation of four further potential
In early 2002, Kapoor bought from the Indo-Nepal Art Centre
in Mumbai, India a third-century limestone relief depicting worshippers of
Buddha (Worshippers Relief) stolen
from the Chadavaram Stupa, Andhra Pradesh, India. He valued it at approximately
$550,000. In 2005, Kapoor sold the relief to the National Gallery of Australia
(NGA) for $585,000. In September 2016, the NGA returned it to India (NGA 2016;
Arlt and Folan 2018). A fax from the Indian vendor records that Kapoor paid
$70,000 for the relief, meaning a mark-up from cost price to selling price of
736 per cent and a potential mark-up for Kapoor’s valuation of 686 per cent.
In late 2002, Kapoor bought from the Indo-Nepal Art Centre
in Mumbai, India two objects stolen from the Vriddhagiriswarar Temple in
Vriddhachalam, Tamil Nadu, India. The first was a twelfth-century granite
sculpture of the goddess Pratyangira,
which he valued at approximately $250,000. In July 2005, Kapoor sold the Pratyangira
to the NGA for $247,000. In September 2016, the NGA returned it to India (NGA
2016). The second was a tenth-century granite sculpture of Shiva as
Ardhanarishsvara (Ardhanari), which Kapoor
valued at $250,000. In June 2004, he sold the Ardhanari to the Art Gallery of
New South Wales (AGNSW) for $225,000. In September 2014, the AGNSW returned it to
India. A fax from the Indian vendor records that Kapoor paid 11,00,000 rupees
($22,634) for both pieces together, meaning a mark-up from cost price to
selling price of 1,985 per cent and a potential mark-up for Kapoor’s valuation
of 2,109 per cent.
The magnitude of these price mark-ups is extraordinary, averaging
out at 1,569 per cent. There is also reasonably good agreement between Kapoor’s
valuation of the objects and the price he ultimately secured when selling them.
Thus Kapoor’s valuations can be used as proxy price indicators, which allows
the calculation of several more potential price mark-ups.
In 2005, Kapoor visited Pakistan where he purchased two
objects. The first was a second–third-century
marble Buddha head (Monumental Buddha
Head), which he valued at approximately $4.5 million. On 5 January 2012,
DHS-HSI agents seized the Buddha Head from storage in New York. The second was
schist Herakles-Vajrapani holding a sword (Herakles
with Sword), which he valued at approximately $1.75 million. On 26 July
2012, DHS-HSI agents seized the Herakles from storage in New York. According to
informant testimony, Kapoor paid $500,000 for a batch of antiquities including
these two pieces. Even if the cost of other purchased antiquities is excluded,
the combined valuation of $6.25 million represents a potential mark-up from
cost price of 1,150 per cent. Allowing for the cost of the other three
antiquities in the $500,000 cost price, the real percentage mark-up would be
In April 2006, Kapoor visited Pakistan where he purchased
from Rawaiee Al Lotus a number of antiquities, including five eighteenth–nineteenth-century glazed
Quranic wall tiles (Quranic Wall Tiles).
He valued them in total at $445,000. A fax from Rawaiee Al Lotus shows Kapoor
paid $20,000 for the tiles, a potential mark-up from cost price of 2,125 per
On the same April 2006 buying trip, Kapoor bought a second–fourth-century schist statue
of Herakles as Vajrapani (Monumental
Herakles), which he valued at $950,000. He also bought a second–fourth-century Seated Buddha
on Lotus (Seated Buddha), which he valued
at $650,000. On 26 July 2012, DHS-HSI agents seized both pieces from storage in
New York. Kapoor bought the Herakles and Buddha as part of a lot containing
three other objects. A fax from Rawaiee Al Lotus shows that Kapoor paid
$200,000 for the lot. Even if the cost of the other three antiquities in the
lot is excluded, the combined selling price of $1.6 million for the Herakles
and the Buddha represents a mark-up from cost price of 700 per cent. Allowing
for the cost of the other three antiquities, the real percentage mark-up for
the two pieces would be higher still.
In 2005, Kapoor purchased a twelfth-century sandstone
sculpture of the monkey god Hanuman from
an Indian dealer in New York, which he valued at approximately $225,000. On 26
July 2012, DHS-HSI agents seized the Hanuman from storage in New York. An informant
states that Kapoor paid $30-40,000 for the Hanuman, a mark-up from cost price
to selling price of approximately 543 per cent.
Mark-up (per cent)
Pratyangira and Ardhanari
Monumental Buddha Head and Herakles with Sword
Quranic Wall Tiles
Monumental Herakles and Seated Buddha
Again, averaging out at about 1,200 per cent, the magnitude
of these mark-ups is remarkable, though they do not constitute profit. Kapoor
would have needed to deduct associated business costs for such things as staffing,
conservation and storage, not to mention tax. Not least is the fact that many
of the objects remained unsold at the time of the DHS-HSI raids and the
potential mark-ups had yet to be realised. It is interesting that the lowest
mark-up is for the Hanuman, which Kapoor bought once it was already in the USA.
He bought the other objects abroad and imported them, thereby running the risk
they might be seized by customs. Perhaps the element of risk was lower for
Kapoor when buying the Hanuman, with the lower mark-up reflecting a higher
price paid to his supplier who was the one accepting the risk of financial loss
or worse associated with importing the piece. The complaint reckons that at the
very least there are 39 stolen objects worth nearly $36 million unaccounted
for, which probably means they have been sold. That would be something like $33
million for Kapoor before tax and expenses. Was it worth it? He can’t spend the
money in prison.
On 4 June 2008, the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) adopted new guidelines for the acquisition of archaeological and ancient art objects. Going forward, it recommended that a member museum should only acquire an object when there is evidence to show that it was out of its country of modern discovery before 17 November 1970, or exported legally after that date. The AAMD recognised that there are likely to be objects in circulation that were out of their countries of modern discovery before 1970, but without validating provenance. In such cases, the AAMD recommended that if after appropriate due diligence a member museum concludes that an object was likely to have been out of its country of discovery before 17 November 1970, the object could be acquired but a record of the acquisition should be posted on a new web-based Object Registry. The posting on the Object Registry would constitute a public record of the acquisition, allowing any dispossessed owner to identify the object and make a recovery claim to the museum concerned. On 23 January 2013, the AAMD amended its 2008 guidelines, allowing the acquisition by gift or bequest of objects without the necessary pre-1970 provenance provided a promissory agreement had been reached before the 4 June date of the 2008 guidelines.
By March 2018, the Object Registry listed entries for 1,117 objects in 28 museums. The largest aggregate entry for a single institution comprised 358 objects in the collection of Baltimore’s Walters Art Museum, many of them previously owned by John Bourne. They reflect the museum’s accession in 2009 of 301 objects from the Bourne collection. Aspects of the acquisition have been discussed by Roger Atwood and Donna Yates. Bourne had been assembling his collection since the 1940s, but as the histogram shows, he bought most of his objects after 1970.
As the above example shows, the individual Walters’ Object Registry entries for the Bourne objects state that they were acquired because ‘Communications between the Walters Art Museum and the donor of this gift began in April 2005’. This entry justifies the acquisition by making reference to the amended 2013 AAMD guidelines. Gary Vikan, however, who was director of the Walters at the time of the Bourne acquisition, seemingly contradicts these statements on the Object Registry when he reveals that he first heard about the possible availability of the Bourne Collection ‘near the end of 2008’  – in other words, a few months after the 4 June date of the 2008 guidelines. Before then, in 2000 when he first met Bourne, his hope had been that Bourne might lend the Walters ‘a piece or two’ . At that time, Bourne had promised his collection to the College of Santa Fe.
Vikan defended the acquisition of the Bourne collection by reference to the ‘Vikan Doctrine’ of due diligence, transparency and good faith engagement:
… the acquisition of a work or art would be conducted with full and rigorous investigation and documentation of the work’s history, whether it be a proposed purchase, a promised gift, or a possible long-term loan. If acquired or accepted as a gift or loan, it would then be promptly published on the Walters’ website and on the Object Registry of the Association of Art Museum Directors … the Walters would promptly and openly respond to any plausible claim for repatriation of the work from a possible source country .
The confusion over the date of the acquisition agreement does little to foster confidence in the transparency component of the Vikan Doctrine, but what about due diligence, the ‘full and rigorous investigation and documentation of the work’s history’? The only provenance information provided for the overwhelming majority of Bourne objects on the Walters’ website is the date of Bourne’s purchase and the name of the vendor. There are hardly any indications of provenance dating back to before the date of Bourne’s purchase, and while it is always possible that the objects had been in circulation since before 1970, from what is published they might equally have been fresh out of the ground and new on the market. Accepting material with such flimsy documentation of provenance surely runs counter to the Vikan Doctrine and indeed to the ethical principles of the AAMD guidelines.
In the exhibition catalogue of the collection, Vikan mentions that the acquisition was accompanied by a ‘bequest of $4 million for the research, conservation, display, and teaching of the arts of the ancient Americas’ . It would be hard for any museum to refuse a bequest of that size. Perhaps hard enough for the Walters to have suspended Vikan’s Doctrine and evaded the AAMD’s guidelines.
Vikan, Gary, 2016. Sacred and Stolen: Confessions of a Museum Director. New York: SelectBooks, at page 269.
Ibid, at page 269.
Ibid, at page 270.
Vikan, Gary, 2012. Foreword, in Dorie Reents-Budet (ed.), Exploring Art of the Ancient Americas: The John Bourne Collection. Baltimore: The Walters Art Museum.